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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040955CA

v,
DEVON KINNE,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree
felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor,
burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a second degree
felony (R. 0417-12: 1-2; R. 0417-14: 1-2). This court has
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3 (2) (e) (West 2004) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Should this court consider defendant's claim that the

reasonable doubt instruction was incorrect where defense counsel
affirmatively approved the instruction at trial, thus inviting
the very error from which he appeals?

"Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law
presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness."

State v.

Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, 1 11, 62 P.3d 444. When a party fails
to make an objection, however, no standard of review applies
because the matter is generally waived on appeal.
2.

Did defense counsel perform deficiently when, after the

court denied his motion to dismiss, he failed to move for a
directed verdict?
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington. 4 66 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of
the underlying trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, M

16-17, 12 P.3d 92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are
dispositive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 041714: 1-2). In another case, arising out of an incident a month
earlier, he was charged with burglary and theft (R. 0417-12: 1-2-

2).

The trial court consolidated the two cases for purposes of

trial (R. 126: 148) -1 When all the evidence was in, defendant
moved to dismiss, and the trial court denied the motion (R. 126:
140, 143). The jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 117-18).
The court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison on the felony charge and six months in jail on the
misdemeanor charge, to be served concurrently with the prison
sentence imposed on the two charges arising from the earlier
incident and with credit for time served (Id.).

Defendant filed

this timely appeal (R. 124).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The December Burglary

and

Theft

In December of 2003, defendant decided to rob the home of
the father of someone he disliked (R. 126: 110). To that end, he
and his friend, Christopher Clark, drove defendant's parents'
yellow Cavalier to LaSal (Id. at 114). There, according to
Clark's testimony, defendant burglarized the home while Clark
stayed outside as a lookout (Id. at 109, 112, 114-15).

Defendant

emerged from the home with a CD player and speaker (Id. at 113,
116-17).

In the car on the way back to Salt Lake, defendant

showed Clark a handgun he had also stolen from the home,
distinctive because of its painted handle (Id. at 117).

1

Hereafter, to avoid unnecessary repetition, all cites in
the State's brief to the red record volumes will be referenced to
case 0412-14.
-3-

The officer who investigated the burglary and theft
testified that the home had been forcibly entered, probably with
an ice ax with wood chips stuck to its tip, found inside the home
(Id. at 54-56, 62). The door frame had been split, and "it
looked like the house had been ransacked" (Id. at 50). The
officer also testified that tire prints he later took from the
Cavalier resembled the only set of tire tracks he saw at the
LaSal home (Id. at 79). In addition to a missing entertainment
center, the homeowner listed as stolen two shotguns, 2 rifles,
and a Walther PPK handgun (Id. at 60).
The January

Car

Incident

In early January of 2004, defendant's mother contacted the
San Juan County Sheriff's Office, stating that her son was at a
home in LaSal with her car, the yellow Cavalier, and that she
wanted help in getting it back (Id. at 64). Deputy Michael
Harris responded to the home.

Rather than the expected Cavalier,

however, he found a Jeep parked at the residence (Id. at 65) .
Deputy Harris ran the license number and discovered the vehicle
had been stolen from Salt Lake (Id. at 65).
Deputy Harris entered the home and was directed by its
occupants to a back bedroom.

The deputy knocked and awakened

Christopher Clark (Id. at 65-66).

When the deputy questioned

Clark about the Jeep, Clark told him it belonged to his mother.
Because Deputy Harris knew the Jeep had been stolen, however, he

-4-

arrested Clark and took him outside to his police car (Id. at
66) .
Before the officer could re-enter, the homeowner came
"walking out carrying this pistol hooked on her finger.

She said

it was in the - in the mattress of the bed that Christopher Clark
was sleeping in" (Id. at 66). The deputy then found Clark's
wallet and some papers on the night stand adjacent to the bed and
the key to the Jeep on the floor between the night stand and the
bed (Id^ at 67, 86-87).
Deputy Harris questioned Clark again.

This time, Clark told

him the Jeep belonged to the mother of a friend and that he and
defendant had borrowed it in order to drive from Salt Lake to
LaSal to visit defendant's mother (Id.).

Clark also told Deputy

Harris that defendant's mother's Cavalier had broken down in Salt
Lake.

When the deputy asked Clark if there was anything in the

Cavalier he should know about, Clark admitted to ownership of
marijuana in a black case in the center console (Id. at 68-69;
125).

He specifically declined ownership, however, of other

items of paraphernalia in the bag, which he said belonged to
defendant (Id^ at 70-71).2

2

Items of paraphernalia found in the black bag pursuant to
an inventory search included scales, a mirror, a syringe,
baggies, a spoon handle, and a coin (R. 126: 71). Also found in
the Cavalier was a bullet of the same caliber as the handgun
stolen from the LaSal home and shotgun shells that fit the stolen
shotgun. Additional bullets and shells of the same size were
found in the burglarized home. (Id. at 101).
-5-

Just before trial, Deputy Harris asked Clark one final time
about the ownership of the Jeep (Id. at 75). Clark reiterated
that the Cavalier belonging to defendant's mother had broken down
in Salt Lake (Id. at 76). Then, for the first time, he stated
that he and defendant looked for another car in Salt Lake, found
a Jeep parked in a driveway with its engine running, jumped in,
and took off for Monticello (Id. at 76, 126). Clark also changed
his story about the ownership of the handgun.

At first, he had

told Deputy Harris that it belonged to the woman at whose home he
was living (Id. at 76, 91). Eventually, however, Clark said that
defendant had told him the handgun came from a burglary in LaSal
and that defendant had asked Clark to hold it for him (Id. at 7677, 83).
Christopher Clark's trial testimony was consistent with the
last story he told Deputy Harris.

In addition, he testified that

after he and defendant drove the stolen Jeep to Monticello, he
went to sleep in the back bedroom and defendant went to see his
mother (Id. at 122). He thought defendant had the handgun and
only learned otherwise after the officer awoke him (Id. at 123,
133).

He reiterated that both he and defendant had burglarized

the home in LaSal and that they both had stolen the Jeep in Salt
Lake (Id^ at 126).
Christopher Clark further testified that he had lied in
earlier statements to the police in order to protect defendant
and lessen his own criminal culpability (Id. at 108-09, 128) . He
-6-

conceded that he would be sentenced for his part in the crimes
after his trial testimony against defendant (Id. at 130).
The LaSal homeowner whose house had been burglarized
identified the handgun found on the bed where Clark was sleeping
by a distinctive chip on the clip, as well as by its black
handle, which had been painted over (Id. at 98). In addition,
the serial number on the handgun matched documentation
of ownership that the homeowner provided (Id. at 97).3
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted defendant, as
charged, of burglary, theft, receiving or transferring a stolen
motor vehicle, and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 94).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the jury instruction defining
reasonable doubt was incorrect and that, despite defendant's
failure to object, exceptional circumstances call for appellate
review.

This argument fails at the outset because defendant

affirmatively approved the jury instructions, thus inviting the
alleged error of which he now complains.

Moreover, he fails to

demonstrate any exceptional circumstances.
was correct at the time of trial.

The jury instruction

The fact that the law changed

There was some initial confusion on this point because
the handgun serial number provided by the homeowner appeared to
be different by one digit from the number that appeared on the
handgun. After rechecking the documentation, however, the
homeowner realized he had made a mistake as to that digit. In
fact, the serial numbers matched. See R. 126: 97.
-7-

nine months after his conviction does nothing to undermine the
correctness of the instruction at the time it was given.
Defendant also argues that his counsel performed
ineffectively by failing to file a motion for directed verdict.
Where a motion for directed verdict and a motion to dismiss are
judged by the same legal standard, and where the court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court would also necessarily
have denied a motion for directed verdict.

Because failure to

make a futile motion cannot constitute deficient performance,
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim necessarily
fails.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION WAS
INCORRECT BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL
AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE
INSTRUCTION AT TRIAL, THUS INVITING
THE VERY ERROR OF WHICH HE NOW
COMPLAINS; EVEN ON THE MERITS HIS
CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION
WAS CORRECT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL
Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction given
at his trial violated the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.

See Br. of Aplt. at 7-8.

That reasonable doubt

instruction, in compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219
(Utah 1997), overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005
UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, informed the jury that "[t]he state must
eliminate all reasonable doubt" (R. 104). After defendant's
-8-

conviction was final, the Utah Supreme Court "expressly
abandon[ed]" the "^obviate all reasonable doubt' element of the
Robertson test."

State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 1 30.

Relying on

Reyes, defendant argues that the reasonable doubt instruction
here created the possibility that the jury found him guilty based
on a degree of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Br. of Aplt. at 7.

See

Because he did not raise this issue at trial,

he seeks review under the rubric of exceptional circumstances.
Id. at 11-12.
At the outset, defendant's claim fails because defense
counsel at trial affirmatively approved of the instruction to
which he now objects, thus inviting the alleged error on appeal.
When asked if she had any exceptions to the jury instructions,
defense counsel responded, "I accept everything.

That's fine.

They're all okay" (R. 126: 148).
Under these factual circumstances, defendant's claim should
not be considered.

See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If

52-55,

70 P.3d 111 (refusing to find error where defendant approved the
instruction before it was given to the jury).

Rule 19(e), Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in part: "Unless a party
objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction,
the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a
manifest injustice."

Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (e)(West 2004).

-9-

Thus,

manifest injustice, not exceptional circumstances, is the sole
route around the preservation rule.4
Taking its guidance from rule 19(e), Utah's appellate courts
"have been very reluctant to review jury instructions and other
matters not preserved for appeal by means of an objection at
trial."

State v. Anderson, 927 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996);

accord State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987); State v, John,
770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989).

Most pertinent to this case, "the

manifest injustice exception has no application in cases in which
the defendant invited the very error complained of on appeal."
State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, 1 22, 975 P.2d 469 (quotations
and citation omitted); accord State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 5
54.

Here, where defense counsel specifically approved the jury

instructions on the record, any claimed error on appeal was
plainly invited.

For this reason, his claim cannot give rise to

a manifest injustice and should not be considered.
Moreover, even on the merits, defendant cannot prevail.

He

argues that his failure to object to the jury instruction at
trial should be excused by exceptional circumstances because

"ya

change in law or the settled interpretation of law color[ed
defense counsel's] failure to have raised [the] issue at trial.'"

4

The exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined
and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies." State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993). Defendant has cited
no authority for the far-reaching proposition that any case
accepted for certiorari review creates an exceptional
circumstance for purposes of circumventing the preservation rule.
-10-

Br. of Aplt. at 11 (quoting State ex. rel. T.M., 2003 UT App 191,
1 16, 73 P.3d 959). Specifically, defendant points to the
following chronology:
January 2004

Court of Appeals issues State
v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84
P.3d 841, upholding the
"obviate all reasonable doubt"
jury instruction, similar to
instruction given in this case

May 2004

Utah Supreme Court grants
certiorari review in Reyes.

September 2004 Trial and conviction in this
case.
June 2005

Supreme Court abandons
"obviate all reasonable doubt"
instruction. State v. Reyes,
2005 UT 33, I 30, 116 P.3d
305.

In essence, defendant argues that because Reyes was accepted for
certiorari review prior to his trial, the law was necessarily
"unsettled" and should excuse his failure to object to the jury
instruction.
First, from a policy perspective, defendant's argument would
give rise to a wholly untenable rule.

Whenever the Utah Supreme

Court granted certiorari review, it would necessarily create an
"unsettled" area of law subject to automatic consideration on
appeal as an exceptional circumstance.

Such a rule would

undermine the invited error doctrine without any countervailing
advancement to the administration of justice.
Second, the law was not unsettled in September of 2004 when
defendant was tried and convicted.
-11-

The law governing the

"obviate all reasonable doubt'' language in the reasonable doubt
jury instruction had been clear and consistent since 1989, when
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 114749 (Utah 1989), adopted an analysis requiring a reasonable doubt
instruction that "*should specifically state that the State's
proof must obviate all reasonable doubt.'" State v. Robertson,
932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997)(quoting State v. Ireland, 773
P.2d 1375, 1381 (Utah 1989)(Stewart, J., dissenting)).
The law, then, was clear at the time defendant was tried.
It simply changed nine months after his conviction was final.
See State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 5 30 (abandoning requirement of
"obviate all reasonable doubt" language); accord State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45, 1 21.

The later change did nothing to undermine the

correctness of the instruction at defendant's trial.5

For this

reason, even on the merits, defendant's argument fails.

5

Moreover, nothing prevented defendant at trial from
challenging the reasonable doubt instruction if he thought it was
constitutionally infirm. Indeed, the court of appeals in Reyes
had described the Robertson three-part reasonable doubt test as
"constitutionally flawed." State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 5 22,
30, 84 P.3d 841. Nothing prevented defendant from preserving his
issue by making this argument at trial. See State v. Lopez, 886
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) (holding that defendant could not raise due
process for first time on appeal in absence of establishing
either plain error or exceptional circumstances).
-12-

POINT TWO
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS
MOTION TO DISMISS, DEFENDANT WAS
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, WHERE THAT
MOTION PLAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN
FUTILE
Defendant also argues that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by not moving for a directed verdict at the close of
the State's evidence (Br. of Aplt. at 12). Defendant contends
that although his counsel moved to dismiss at that juncture, he
also should also have moved for a directed verdict because "Utah
appellate courts have imposed separate standards for granting
motions for directed verdicts than for [sic] motions to dismiss"
(Id. at 13). These "separate standards," he argues, mean that
NN

[t]he two motions cannot be substituted for one another" (Id. at

14) .
Defendant's argument fails as a matter of law because the
standards for a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed
verdict are, for all practical purposes, identical.
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss at the end of the
State's case-in-chief, the trial court must grant the motion
"[i]f the State fails to produce ^believable evidence of all the
elements of the crime charged.'"

State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,

f 40, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 13, 20
P.3d 300 (citations and quotations omitted)). "Believable
evidence," in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the
evidence must be "capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond
-13-

a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at 1 41
(quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at f 15).
Similarly, when a defendant files a motion for directed
verdict at the end of the State's case, the trial court has to
determine whether "the State . . . establish[ed] a prima facie
case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of
all the elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Clark, 2001 UT
9 at 1 13 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah
1992)(citations omitted)).

If the jury can find defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court must submit the case
for its consideration.

Ld. (citing State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d

1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3;
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (p) .
At the end of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss
for insufficient evidence, and the trial court denied the motion
(R. 126: 140, 143-44). 6

Denial of the motion told defendant that

the State had adduced sufficient evidence for a jury to fairly
conclude that all elements of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Consequently, had defendant moved for a

directed verdict, which he would have done at precisely the same
time, he would have received precisely the same ruling.

That is,

where the evidence was sufficient to support all elements of the
crime charged, it was also necessarily sufficient to establish a

6

Defendant nowhere challenges the correctness of the trial
court's denial of his motion to dismiss.
-14-

prima facie case.

The distinction defendant seeks to make

between a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed verdict is
nothing more than an exercise in semantics.

See, e.g., State v.

Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, 1 14 (employing identical analysis
for a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed verdict).
Where a motion for a directed verdict would have been judged
by the same standard as the motion to dismiss that counsel made
and the court denied, there is no possibility that such a motion
would have resulted in anything but another denial.

Defendant

cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because the failure to raise a futile objection can never be an
adequate ground for objectively deficient performance.

See,

e.g., State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, 5 27, 55 P.3d 1147.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions of one count each of receiving or transferring a
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.
7\A^"

RESPECTFULLY submitted this J]_

day of October, 2005.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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